Twenty years after the European Commission's White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the integration of national markets for corporate control continues to lag behind the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. To what extent does the protracted political battle over legal harmonization in this area reflect a clash of interests between liberal and coordinated national varieties of capitalism? To find out, we map the distribution of political support for liberal takeover rules within and across countries by analyzing a roll call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. Our data shows that, in line with the clash-of-capitalisms hypothesis, nationality did trump party group position on a left-right axis as a predictor of delegates' attitudes toward takeover regulation. Given the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage to increase in the near future.
Introduction
European Commission efforts to create a unified European market for corporate control stretch back more than thirty years. The EU takeover directive which passed in December 2003 is a far cry from this ambition. After decades of negotiation, member states agreed to disagree on the legality of anti-takeover defenses. Twenty years after the Commission's white book on the completion of the internal market, the European Union remains a non-integrated economic area of different national varieties of corporate governance.
Our analysis of the political issues at stake draws out two distinct lines of conflict pertaining to takeover regulation: a "class conflict", because active markets for corporate control have distributional implications inside firms by securing benefits for shareholders at the expense of employees; and a "clash of capitalisms", because the benefits and costs of a unified European takeover regime are distributed unevenly across EU member states depending on the nature of national corporate governance arrangements prior to harmonization. (here starts p. 308) A comment by Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein made no secret of the fact that both effects were intended. In November 2002, the Commissioner explained that "[the trade unions] cling to traditional rights as though these were valid for ever, regardless of economic conditions. They want to remain within the comfortable and secure boundaries of what has been referred to as the Rhenish model of capitalism, where stakeholders are pampered instead of shareholders, and where consultations take place on numerous round tables. However, if Europe really wants to become the most competitive and most modern economic area, it must leave the comfortable setting of the Rhenish model and subject itself to the harsher conditions of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism, where the rewards, but also the risks, are higher." (Bolkestein 2002) Which of these conflicts is more salient in political struggles over the European Commission's efforts to create a single European market for corporate control? To answer this question, we constructed a dataset based on a 2001 roll-call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament and tested competing hypotheses by applying a binary logit model. Specifically, we investigate whether members of the European Parliament vote according to their party group affiliation, as the literature on European party systems would suggest, or whether nationality was a stronger predictor of voting behavior, as on might expect from research in the Varieties of Capitalism tradition.
We find, first, that the relative importance of nationality and party group affiliation varied systematically depending on the party group in question. Intra-group cohesion was strong among the small left-wing, green, liberal and right-wing party groups. By contrast, the large center-right and center-left party groups were both split down the middle along national lines. Second, and more importantly, the overall magnitude of support for the takeover directive varied dramatically across countries. At the extremes, more than ninety percent of all German delegates voted against the directive, while more than ninety percent of British delegates voted in favour.
Our findings imply that persistent variation in corporate governance rules across EU member states is not just a result of incremental differences in the partisan composition of national governments. Instead, we observe a "clash of capitalisms" alignment with broad cross-party alliances within countries defending their respective national variety of corporate governance. Several large-n studies on cleavage lines in the European Parliament have shown that the partisan divide tends to dominate over the national divide. Our analytical framework provides a starting point for the systematic analysis and explanation of cases that deviate from the dominant pattern. (here starts p. 309)
In view of the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage to increase in the near future.
History of the EU takeover directive
The first effort to harmonize takeover rules across EU member states dates back to the early 1970s, when the European Commission appointed the Robert Pennington, a law professor at Birmingham University, to present a report on takeover regulations in the European Community. The Pennington Report on Takeover Offers and Other Offers i , presented in November 1973, was accompanied by a draft directive. Like later drafts, the content of the Pennington directive was strongly influenced by the UK City Code. It was abandoned after several years of informal discussion due to limited interest among member states. Instead, the Commission contented itself with issuing a voluntary code in form of the 1977 Recommendation on Securities Transactions (Johnston 1980: 183) .
In the mid-1980s, the drive towards completion of the internal market and a surge in large scale controversial takeover battles brought takeover legislation back onto the agenda (Berglöf and Burkart 2003) . A draft directive presented in 1989 was mainly concerned with assuring a transparent market and eliminating speculative abuses. The German government insisted that a takeover directive should either rule out all defence mechanisms, including multiple voting rights, or none (Guerrera and Jennen 2003) .
Amending the directive proved difficult because the French and Scandinavian On November 27, after months of intensive bargaining, the Council found a compromise solution leaving each member state to decide for itself whether or not to require companies incorporated within its territory to apply the neutrality rule (article 9) and/or the breakthrough rule (article 11). Where member states refrain from requiring companies to adopt these rules, they must allow companies to adopt them voluntarily. But member states may implement a reciprocity clause to exempt companies which apply the neutrality rule and/or the breakthrough rule from applying these rules if they become the subject of an offer launched by a company which does not apply the same rule. 
What was at stake?
The stated aim of the Commission's legislative initiative was not merely to integrate European markets in order to "strengthen the legal certainty of cross-border takeover bids in the interests of all concerned" and "ensure protection for minority shareholders" but also to undertake "harmonization conducive to corporate restructuring" (Commission 2002: 3) . In other words, the goal was not a common legal framework per se, but the realization of a substantive vision regarding the nature of this framework. The Commission wanted the integrated European market for corporate control to be an active one. The level playing field was to be achieved by removing rather than adding barriers to takeovers.
The idea that promoting hostile bids will enhance company performance derives from microeconomic theories of "moral hazard problems" in principal-agent relationships (Fama 1980; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . The managers of a large corporation are typically not its owners. Because their interests diverge from those of owners, managers cannot always be relied upon to maximize shareholder value. This problem is said to be particularly acute in firms with diffuse ownership, because shareholders who hold only a minute fraction of a company have little incentive to spend time monitoring managers (Berle and Means 1932) .
Exposure to takeover threats is said to mitigate moral hazard problems by improving managerial incentives to maximize shareholder value (Manne 1965) . Firms performing below potential are attractive takeover targets. Hostile bidders can make money by taking control and improving shareholder value orientation. Incumbent managers risk losing their job in the event of a hostile takeover. According to the theory, the threat of a hostile takeover therefore provides sufficient incentive for managers to maximize shareholder value.
To ensure adequate exposure to takeover threats, managers need to be prevented from interfering with hostile bids. Otherwise, they may be tempted to undertake value reducing activities that make them more difficult to dismiss or that make the company less attractive to the bidder. For example, they could diversify into product lines in which they have specialized knowledge or purchase assets in one of the markets in which the raider operates, in order to create a high combined market share and thereby create anti-trust problems (Edlin and Stiglitz 1995; Hay and Morris 1991: 519) . The neutrality rule purports to provide a solution to this problem by increasing the supervision of agents by their principals during the period of a bid.
The many caveats to this simple microeconomic theory vi barely entered the political discourses on the directive. Neither supporters nor opponents questioned its efficacy in redistributing power to shareholders. Instead, (here starts p. 313) disagreement revolved mainly around whether this was desirable. Two separate distributional considerations were relevant here: First, active markets for corporate control have distributional implications inside firms by securing benefits for shareholders at the expense of employees. Second, due to different national starting points, the benefits and costs of a unified market for corporate control are distributed unevenly across EU member states.
"Class conflict": Distributional implications inside firms
Gains made by shareholders of target companies in takeover bids tend to accrue from income transfers made at the expense of employees, suppliers, and customers of the target firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Deakin and Slinger 1997: 124; Cook and Deakin 1999: 28) . This follows from the fact that non-value maximizing behavior of the management of hostile targets largely consists of "transferring corporate wealth from shareholders to other non-management constituencies, such as employees, suppliers and customers" (Jensen 1986 ). Examples of redistributive consequences of increased shareholder value orientation are wage decreases, job cuts or the removal of assets from employee pension funds (Shleifer and Summers 1988) . Empirically, a comparison of how net surplus value was distributed among labour, capital suppliers and governments for the 100 largest European companies between 1991 and 1994 shows that companies in countries with active markets for corporate control tend to pay higher dividends, while companies in countries without hostile takeovers pay a higher part of net value added in wages (de Jong 1997:
Besides shifting material resources towards shareholders, active markets for corporate control also shift decision-making powers within the firm. Mergers and friendly takeovers are preceded by negotiations that leave scope for employee participation in the decision-making process. By contrast, hostile takeover offers by definition are addressed directly to shareholders, bypassing the stakeholders of the target company. Managers and workers of the target company may be informed or even consulted, but they have no say in the final decision.
"Clash of capitalisms": Asymmetric impact of the directive on liberal and coordinated market economies vii
The benefits and costs of promoting active markets for corporate control are distributed unevenly not only within firms, but also across countries. Potential takeover targets are distributed unevenly across countries because exposure to takeover threats affects the structure and strategies of companies in ways that determine their attractiveness to hostile bidders. Strong pressures to maximize shareholder value prevent firms from growing beyond the point at which the marginal returns on equity diminish (de Jong 1996) . In the absence of takeover (here starts p. 314) threats, managers can pursue strategies other than maximizing marginal return on equity. For example, they can absorb higher labour costs, avoid layoffs during cyclical downturns or cross-subsidize unprofitable branches of the company.
The profitability gap does not mean that investors in German companies are worse off than investors in British companies. Höpner and Jackson (2001) show that investors in both countries obtain comparable returns on equity. viii German companies generate lower earnings per share, but this is compensated for by lower share prices. Market value relative to turnover is more than four times higher in Britain than in Germany. Market value relative to the number of employees is more than six times higher in the UK.
However, the "low profits -low price" equilibrium -the typical feature of corporate governance systems in coordinated market economies-is not sustainable under an open market for corporate control. "Underperforming" companies are attractive targets for hostile bidders, who can earn a one-time takeover premium by increasing the company's profitability by shifting resources from stakeholders to shareholders. Moreover, lower relative market valuations make corporations vulnerable to takeovers through share swaps.
Corporations with higher market valuations can use their shares as a currency to give premiums to shareholders of the target firm.
The above suggests that in a common European market for corporate control, potential takeover targets will initially be distributed unevenly across countries. Due to longstanding cross-national differences in the level of legal and non-legal takeover barriers, companies' prior exposure to takeover threats varies dramatically across EU member states. ix Potential targets are likely to be concentrated in countries whose companies have had limited prior exposure to takeover threats, while more potential bidders are likely to come from countries where active markets for corporate control are already established.
A second reason to expect a "clash of capitalisms" cleavage is provided by research in the varieties of capitalism tradition. By exposing their previously sheltered companies to takeover threats, coordinated market economies sacrifice "comparative institutional advantages" in product niches where firms from liberal market economies are not competitive. Exposure to takeover threats contravenes production strategies that rely extensively on long-term and relationship-specific investment (Streeck 1991) . Firms pursuing such strategies are concentrated in countries that have so far been sheltered from takeovers (Hall and Soskice 2001) .
Takeover threats discourage long-term and non-transferable investment under conditions of asymmetric information or contractual imperfections. Managers under pressure to satisfy footloose investors at any point in time have an incentive to increase the shortterm stock market valuation of their (here starts p. 315) companies by raising dividends at the expense of productivity-enhancing investments whose value is difficult to assess from the outside.
x Workers and suppliers have insufficient incentives to acquire specialist skills or equipment that are of little value outside the firm that employs them, if they do not expect the relationship with that particular firm to last beyond the short term. xi The threat of contract termination, which increases with greater exposure to takeover threats, reduces incentives to incur relationship-specific investments (Shleifer and Summers 1988) .
The detrimental effects of active markets for corporate control on long-term and relationship specific investment are more disconcerting for some countries than others, because firms pursuing production strategies that rely on these types of investment only prosper in countries where hostile takeovers are rare.
In sum, analysis of the political issues at stake reveals two distinct lines of conflict.
First, active markets for corporate control have distributional implications inside firms by securing benefits for shareholders at the expense of employees. Second, due to different national starting points, the benefits and costs of a unified market for corporate control are distributed unevenly across EU member states.
Research question and hypotheses
Which of these considerations was more salient in the political struggle over the directive which ultimately transformed a far-reaching liberalizing harmonization into a guarantee for the persistence of different national takeover regimes? A priori, a plausible case can be made for both the "class conflict" view and the "clash of capitalisms" view.
Party group cohesion across national borders might be expected because of the distributional implications inside firms of an active market for corporate control. Comparative research on political parties has shown that party programs, strategies and policy outcomes broadly reflect the interests of the parties' respective socioeconomic clienteles (Budge and Robertson 1987; Schmidt 2002; Alt 1985; Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Hibbs 1977; Hibbs 1992; Hicks and Swank 1992; Wilensky 2002) . The further to the left a political party, the more it should lean towards workers in distributional struggles between workers and shareholders. As discussed in section 3.1 above, the promotion of active markets for corporate control -a key aim of the directive -benefits shareholders at the ex- Coordinated wage bargaining systems contribute to a relatively egalitarian income distribution by preventing wage dispersion (Mosher 2002) . To the extent that their maintenance depends on weakly developed markets for corporate control, left-leaning parties and their clienteles have an additional reason to oppose the directive.
The competing hypothesis, whereby nationality should trump party group affiliation as a predictor of voting behavior can be made plausible in the light of the asymmetric impact of the takeover directive across EU member states. As explained in section 3.2 above, countries starting from a status quo of high barriers to takeovers have more companies attractive to hostile bidders or pursuing production strategies that are contravened by takeover threats than countries where active markets for corporate control are a longstanding feature. Regardless of their views on the distributional conflict within firms, delegates should be reluctant to endorse initiatives that undermine the comparative institutional advantages that firms in their home country enjoy (Hall and Soskice 2001: 52) .
Given differences in production strategies between liberal and coordinated market economies, one might therefore expect delegates from coordinated market economies to be less inclined to support the directive. 
Dependent and Independent Variables
We use a binary logit model to predict the voting behavior of each delegate, given her scores on the independent variables discussed below. The second independent variable, La Porta et al. -Index, approximates the distance of the directive from the status quo on takeover regulation in the delegate's home country.
As explained in section 3.2 above, countries starting from a status quo of low shareholder orientation have more companies attractive to hostile bidders or pursuing production strategies that are incompatible with takeover threats than countries where active markets for corporate control have long forced companies to focus on shareholder value. As a proxy for the shareholder orientation of the corporate governance system, we use the La Porta et al.-Index of shareholder protection xiii xiv (La Porta et al. 1998 ). This ordinal index ranges from zero to six, where zero indicates very low protection of shareholder interests (Belgium) while six indicates very high shareholder protection. The highest score among countries in our sample is five (UK).
xv
The third independent variable, government/opposition, controls for the possibility that support for the directive is systematically higher among delegates from parties with government responsibility in their home countries (here starts p. 318) (Hix 2001: 673) .
Governing parties are directly represented in the Council of Ministers. Unlike opposition parties, they thus have some influence on shaping the directives before they are presented to the European Parliament for ratification. To control for the possibility that this affects attitudes toward the directive, we use a binary variable which takes on the value 1 when the subgroup is in government at the national level and the value 0 when the subgroup is in opposition at home.
The fourth independent variable, country size, controls for the possibility that support for the directive is systematically higher among delegates from large countries. Important pieces of EU legislation are sometimes informally hammered out by the governments of large member states, with small member states complaining about being excluded from the bargaining table. To control for the possibility that large member states had a disproportional influence on the design of the takeover directive, and that this influenced attitudes toward the final version, we include the size of the delegate's home country, measured in terms of population in 2001.
The fifth independent variable, economic growth, controls for the possibility that delegates' attitudes toward takeover regulation are influenced by the economic dynamism of their home country. Companies in expanding economies may be more interested in a takeover-facilitating framework than companies in stagnating economies. We therefore include GDP growth in the home country of the subgroup over the five years prior to the vote i.e. between 1995 and 2000. This control variable takes values from 9.01 percent (Germany) to 41.01 percent for the Irish economy, which was expanding enormously during the 1990s.
Results
The coefficients of the logit regression on delegates' voting decision are reported in table 1 below. All independent variables are significant at the .01 level in all models.
Model 2 has the best fit statistics, with McFadden's Pseudo R² = .4041. As always with non-linear binary regression models, the estimated parameters do not provide directly useful information for understanding the relationship between the independent variables and the outcome. xvi The logit coefficients capture the change in the log odds for a unit change in the independent variable, but this has very little substantive meaning. A simple non-linear transformation allows for the following more intuitive interpretation of effects in terms of changes of the odds: A unit move to the right on the party group affiliation index increases the odds of voting "yes" by between 172 and 260 percent, depending on the model. Likewise, for each one-step increase in the La Porta et al.-Index score of the delegate's home country, the (here starts p. 320) odds of the delegate voting "yes" increase by between 182 and 261 percent, depending on the model. If the delegate's party is in government at the national level, the odds of the delegate voting "yes" increase by between 74 and 108 percent. However, when looking at these results, it is essential to bear in mind that a constant factor change in the odds does not correspond to a constant change or a constant factor change in the probability. Logit predicted probabilities of the delegate voting "yes" for all categories of the two explanatory variables, holding the three control variables constant at their mean. Software: STATA 8. Table 2 shows that, the further to the left a delegate's party group was on the left-right axis, and the less shareholder oriented her home country was prior to passage of the directive, the less likely it is that the delegate supported the directive. For example, the probability that a member of the far-left GUE/NGL from a country scoring 0 on the LaPorta Index voted "yes" was .0013. For a member of the far-right UEN from the same country, the probability was .4353. These results suggest that EU parliamentarians are indeed A closer look at the data reveals that this loyalty conflict is resolved differently depending on the party group in question. Table 3 In all countries except Spain, Italy and France, more than 80 percent of delegates from center-right and center-left parties voted together across party lines (see table 3 above). Given that 65 percent of all delegates belong to either the PSE or the PPE-DE groups, this means that for most delegates, considerations related to their party group af-filiation were not the dominant influence on voting behavior. Figure 3 shows that the overall percentage of delegates supporting the directive varies dramatically across countries, ranging from one percent in Germany to more than ninety percent in Denmark and the UK.
In sum, whether nationality or party group affiliation was the stronger determinant of voting behavior depends on the party group in question. Intra-group cohesion was strong among the left-wing, green, liberal and right-wing party blocks. By contrast, the larger center-right (PPE-DE) and center-left party blocks (PSE) were both internally divided, with nationality serving as a strong predictor of voting behavior.
What explains the observed pattern?
Why did overall support for the directive vary so dramatically across countries?
As discussed in section 3.2 above, one possible explanation could be the asymmetric economic impact of the directive on different member states, depending on the degree of investor protection prior to passage of the directive. The data displayed in figure 4 is broadly compatible with this hypothesis. In Belgium, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and Austria, where shareholder (here starts p. 323) protection is below average, less than 30 percent of all delegates supported the directive. In Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and the UK, where shareholder protection is relatively strong, more than 70 percent of all delegates voted in favor. This may seem surprising in the cases of Finland and Sweden, where high levels of employment protection indicate broad political support for the protection of employee interests, even though investor protection and market capitalization are above average. Redistribution from workers to shareholders occurs when a corporate governance system moves from a "low profitability -low share price" equilibrium to higher profitability and share price valuation. In the Nordic countries, where the transition to a relatively capital market oriented position has already occurred, even Social Democratic parties may see no reason for opposing investor oriented corporate governance features. G e r m a n y G r e e c e A u s t r i a B e l g i u m N e t h e r l a n d s S p a i n I t a l y F r a n c e F i n l a n d L u x e m b o u r g I r e l a n d S w e d e n P o r t u g a l U K D e n m a r k
Country % of country's delegates voting yes
Why does the strength of nationality as a predictor of voting behavior vary so dramatically across party groups? One possible explanation is the commitment of non-centrist delegates to clearly defined transnational ideologies. The ideologies of liberal and leftwing parties are hard to square with "varieties of capitalism" conceptions of national interest. Liberals distrust the efficacy of non-market forms of coordination. For them, the economic dislocation caused by a dismantling of takeover barriers does not contravene the national interest of coordinated market economies. Rather, they see it as a necessary evil on the way towards a purer form of capitalism which they regard as superior. Left-wing parties in liberal market economies are likely to care more about maintaining solidarity with their comrades abroad than about ensuring optimal economic performance of their particular variety of capitalism. Alternatively, greater cohesion of the smaller parties might be due to the fact that their degree of national fractionalization was lower. Three of the seven countries with below average scores on the La Porta Index (Germany, Austria and Greece) did not have any delegates affiliated with the liberal (ELDR) and rightist (UEN) party groups, and two of the seven countries with above average scores on the La Porta Index (Ireland and the UK)
did not have any delegates affiliated with the leftist GUE/NGL party group.
2 Implications and outlook
The most interesting aspects of our data are the degree and partisan composition of support for the directive in different EU member states. By itself, it is hardly surprising that the majority of politicians from countries with weak shareholder orientation wants to preserve weak shareholder orientation, while the majority of politicians from countries with strong shareholder protection wants to preserve strong shareholder orientation. If it were otherwise, those same majorities would change their domestic corporate governance (Noury 2002; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Hix, Noury, and Roland forthcoming) . In the takeover case, nationality trumps party group affiliation as a predictor of voting behavior. Second, the large centrist party groups (PSE and EPP) are generally among the most internally cohesive groups in the European parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2005) . In the takeover case, both of them were split down the middle. Third, we find clear differences in the relative influence of nationality and party group affiliation depending on the party group in question. While the implications to be drawn from a single outlier case for the study of voting patterns in general is obviously limited, our analysis thus provides a starting point for further research.
For example, it might be worthwhile comparing the roll-call vote on the takeover directive with roll-call votes on other pieces of legislation to see whether similar patterns prevail.
The exhaustive data set of pre-2001 EP roll call votes compiled by Hix et al. (2005) should lend itself well to such endeavors.
We suspect that, due to the onset of a new phase of European integration, the sali- (Mallin and Jelic 2000) . It is therefore to be expected that Eastern enlargement will swell the ranks of opponents to takeover liberalization, at least in the short term.
In the short-run, market-driven convergence is equally unlikely. The takeover directive passed in 2003 contains a clause which requires member states to allow their companies to adopt the controversial articles 9 and 11 on a voluntary basis. Proponents of the clause are hoping that market mechanisms will achieve the level playing field which politicians refused to legislate. The idea is that companies unwilling to adopt the neutrality rule or the breakthrough rule will be penalized with lower market valuations. However, previous experience with voluntary codes casts some doubt over the efficacy of this mechanism. In Germany, a voluntary codex pertaining to investor protection in takeover situations, drawn up in 1995, was ignored by about half of all German listed companies.
Pressure from stock markets or shareholder assemblies was evidently too weak to force companies into voluntary submission.
This is not to say that divergence will persist for ever, or that no changes have oc- Holmes (1990) iii The purpose of a breakthrough rule is to prevent situations where a bidder owning a substantial amount of the risk-bearing capital of a company cannot exercise control due to deviations from the one-share-one-vote principle. It facilitates the success of hostile bids by ensuring that acquiring a majority stake is sufficient for a takeover. iv Technically, it would have been possible to outvote the Nordic countries in the Council of Ministers, even though there was a reluctance to do so because of worries concerning Sweden's pending decision on the introduction of the Euro (FAZ 2003) . v (Guerrera and Williamson 2003; Blum 2003) vi It is not clear that takeover threats really provide adequate incentives for management to maximize shareholder value. Hostile takeovers are only a threatening prospect if managers have to fear job loss without adequate financial compensation and difficulties in finding comparable positions in the future. Financial compensation clauses -so-called "golden parachutes" -and managerial job mobility reduce the effectiveness of takeover threats. Moreover, takeover threats can only improve management incentives to maximize shareholder value if hostile bidders primarily target underperforming companies. In reality, there are many other plausible motives for takeover bids, including the fortification of management entrenchment in the bidding company, remuneration, diversification or the elimination of competitors vi (see Jenkinson and Mayer 1992) . Strong financial performance is not a sufficient to stave off takeover threats in the latter situations, and might even be counterproductive. For a review of empirical evidence on whether takeovers promote shareholder value, see Cook & Deakin (1999) . vii We use the term as defined by Hall and Soskice (2001) : coordinated market economies are production regimes in which managers strategically coordinate their actions with stakeholders and other firms. viii Comparing indicators of corporate performance for the 19 largest British and 20 largest German industrial firms belonging to the "Europa 500", Höpner and Jackson (2001) show that price-earnings ratios and dividend yields are quite similar in both countries. ix Between 1988 and 1998, 220 hostile takeover attempts were announced in Britain. By contrast, only 20 were announced in France, 12 in Sweden and five in Germany (Schneper and Guillén 2003: 4) . x In a world of perfect information, the price of a share should accurately reflect future payments to which the share gives title. Any cuts in productivity-enhancing investment would lead to an instant drop in the share price by reducing the company's net present value. In reality, the value of investments in research and development, human capital, cooperative labour relations or reputation may be difficult to assess without inside knowledge of the company (see e.g. Stein 1988) xi In a world of perfect contracts, workers and suppliers could ensure financial compensation in the event of premature contract termination. In reality, contracts may be implicit and therefore not legally enforceable. xii The European Court has since decided to withdraw group status from the TDI because its members lacked a shared programme.
xiii Fulfillment of following criteria contributes to a high score on the La Porta et al. -Index: the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy votes to the firm; shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' meeting; cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is allowed; an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting is less or equal to 10 percent; shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a shareholder's vote. For further details, see La Porta et al (1998) . xiv Shareholder protection is one of several dimensions distinguishing different varieties of capitalism; the La Porta et al.-Index is one of the measures used by Hall and Gingerich (2004) xxiv For example, if the odds double from 1:100 to 2:100, the probability increases only by approximately .01. Meanwhile, if the odds are 1:1 and double to 1:2, the probability increases by .167 xxv (for details regarding this computation, see Long and Freese 2001) xxvi For example, the German SPD and British Labour are both affiliated with the PSE (and therefore have index number 2 in our analysis), while German CDU and British Conservatives are both affiliated with the EPP (and therefore have index number 3). However, one could argue that both German parties are to the left of both British parties, so that a more accurate indexation would assign index number 2 to both SPD and CDU and index number 3 to Labour and Conservatives. xxvii For more details on the politics of takeover regulation in Germany and the UK, see Callaghan (2004) , Cioffi (2002) , Höpner (2001) xxviii Chirac's and Schröder's recent protests against "ultra-liberalism" in the context of the services directive may be an example. What unites the neo-Gaullist French President and the Social-Democratic German Chancellor is not a shared party ideology, but rather a common interest in defending their national variety of capitalism against the spread of rules inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model. xxix Although European accounting does not cause redistributive measures comparable to the 2001 takeover directive proposal, we find a similar "clash of capitalisms" pattern in the struggle over IFRS. Belgium, Italy, France and Spain demanded factoring out the IAS 39 rules while United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark opposed this.
